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Abstract: The zoonosis human monkeypox (MPX) was discovered in 1970, twelve years after the
discovery of monkeypox virus (MPXV) in a Danish laboratory in 1958. Historically confined to
West Africa (WA) and the Congo basin (CB), new epidemics in Sudan and the United States of
America (USA) have fuelled new research highlighting environmental factors contributing to the
expanded geographical spread of monkeypox virus (MPXV). A systematic literature review was
conducted in MEDLINE® (Ovid), MEDLINE® (PubMed) and Google Scholar databases using the
search terms: monkeypox, MPXV and “human monkeypox”. The literature revealed MPX has classic
prodromal symptoms followed by a total body rash. The sole distinguishing clinical characteristic
from other pox-like illnesses is the profound lymphadenopathy. Laboratory diagnosis of MPX is
essential, a suitable test for endemic areas is under development but not yet available. For the time
being anti-poxvirus antibodies in an unvaccinated individual with a history of severe illness and rash
can suggest MPX infection. The reservoir host remains elusive yet the rope squirrel and Gambian
pouched rat appear to be the most likely candidates. Transmission includes fomite, droplet, direct
contact with infected humans or animals and consumption of infected meat. Though smallpox
vaccination is protective against MPXV, new non-immune generations contribute to increasing
incidence. Environmental factors are increasing the frequency of contact with potential hosts,
thus increasing the risk of animal-to-human transmission. Increased risk of transmission through
globalisation, conflict and environmental influences makes MPX a more realistic threat to previously
unaffected countries. Health worker training and further development and accessibility of suitable
diagnostic tests, vaccinations and anti-viral treatment is becoming increasingly necessary.
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1. Introduction
Following the eradication of smallpox in 1980, human monkeypox (MPX) was described in
1987 as the most important orthopoxvirus (OPXV) occurring in humans at the time [1]. There are
currently 10 species known in the genus OPXV, including variola (smallpox) [1]. With a 30% case
fatality rate (CFR) and high virulence, smallpox is described as one of the most feared diseases
known to humanity [2]. Monkeypox virus (MPXV) is highly pathogenic [3,4], causing similar clinical
manifestations to smallpox. Smallpox vaccination is known to provide cross-immunity with up to 85%
protection against infection [5,6] or reduction in severity of disease [7–10].
MPXV was first discovered during an outbreak amongst monkeys at a Danish laboratory in
1958 [11]. However, it was not recognised as a human disease until 1970, when a nine-month-old
child became infected in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), formerly known as Zaïre [12]. MPX
is typically found in the tropical rain forests of the Congo basin (CB) and West Africa (WA) [7], and
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DRC continues to report the majority of cases each year [13,14], mainly in children under 10 years [15].
The latest epidemic was in Central African Republic (CAR) in October 2016, resulting in 26 cases, of
which three were laboratory confirmed [16,17].
In 2003 the first MPX outbreak to occur outside of Africa was reported in the United States of
America (USA), after 800 small African mammals were shipped from Ghana into Texas [11,15,18,19].
Amongst the shipment were three rope squirrels, two giant pouched rats, and nine dormice infected
with MPXV [20]. The infected rodents were sold to wholesale distributers, where they were kept in
close proximity with American native prairie dogs (PD). Thereupon the PD became infected with
MPXV prior to being sold to a second animal distributor [11,15]. Subsequently MPX spread to five
states with a total of 47 cases [6,15] triggering an importation ban on all African rodents into the
USA [5,6]. The Sudanese outbreak of 2005 constitutes the second epidemic of MPX recorded outside of
the CB and WA regions [21] (See Figure 1 for outbreak timeline).
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MPXV is a brick-shaped enveloped virus measuring 200–250 nm, which replicates in the
cytoplasm, not the nucleus [14]. Two clades of MPXV have been identified through genomic sequencing:
WA and CB clades [15]. WA and CB MPXV differ in virulence [11,18] and are genetically distinct [25].
It is suggested that WA MPXV is attenuated and less transmissible than CB [14,26,27]. However,
differences in disease severity may also be affected by transmission route, host susceptibility, and
the quantity of virus inoculated [18]. The dose required to induce clinical disease varies considerably.
MPXV is a typical zoonosis in that the majority of documented infections are from an animal
source [5,28,29]. During the WHO active surveillance program in DRC between 1981 and 1986, 72% of
the MPX cases were found to be zoonotic transmission [28]. Antibodies to MPXV have been detected
in multiple animal species, suggesting the natural lifecycle is a complex interaction of reservoir and
incidental hosts [9,11]. Though MPXV is not as virulent as variola virus [14], human-to-human
transmission is possible [22]; humans are considered to be incidental hosts [14].
The USA epidemic was the first opportunity to study MPX outside of Africa [8] and the largest
case series of WA clade MPX [30]. Almost five decades after the discovery of MPX, multiple aspects of
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MPXV require clarification, including: the ecology of the virus in wildlife, a complete picture of mode
of transmission from wildlife to humans, and the extent of person-to-person transmission [7]. Despite
an abundance of new information, these fundamental elements remain unanswered.
This paper reviews the current state of knowledge of MPX, with emphasis on clinical features,
transmission, diagnosis and prevention. Discoveries in light of the USA epidemic and critical issues
impacting the future of MPX are identified.
2. Materials and Methods
A systematic literature search was conducted in MEDLINE® (Ovid), MEDLINE® (PubMed) and
Google Scholar databases. The following search terms and Boolean operators were used: monkeypox
OR MPXV OR “human monkeypox”. No date range was specified in the initial Pubmed search in order
to provide historical perspective and capture initial research. The search terms were then modified by
applying the date limits 2000–2016 when searching in the remaining databases. The motivation for
doing so was to focus on contemporary studies conducted since the 2003 USA epidemic. The search
was not limited to human studies as MPXV is a zoonosis. Moreover, no language limits were set as
many countries of interest are French speaking, although all retrieved articles were in English. After
removal of duplicates and non-relevant papers according to title, 132 papers remained for screening of
abstract. As with the title screen, articles were excluded if the abstract content was out of the scope
of this paper in terms of subject specialisation and narrow subject focus; 74 were removed at this
stage. Furthermore, editorial and correspondence pieces were excluded. Therefore, of the 58 full-text
articles assessed for eligibility, six were rejected for virology and immunology specialisation; 16 due to
study quality, and six due to inaccessibility (Figure 2). Ultimately 30 articles remained, which were
complemented with a further 25 papers from hand searches of reference lists and additional sources.
Finally 10 seminal and supporting websites were cited.
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3. Results
3.1. Clinical Features
The most prevalent clinical features of MPX are shown in Table 1. Prodromal symptoms
lasting 2–4 days include fever, fatigue and lymphadenopathy, accompanied by some headache and
backache [7,14,15,19]. Fever reduces 3 days after the onset of a smallpox-like rash, which begins on
the face and quickly spreads centrifugally over the body [7,13], including oral mucosa, genitalia,
and palms and soles, as shown in Figure 3 [13,14,21]. The rash lasts approximately 2–4 weeks,
starting as sequentially forming macules, which transform into papules, vesicles, pustules and finally
crusts [14,32–34].
Table 1. Core Clinical Features of Human Monkeypox.
Specific Symptoms Primary Research 1 Secondary Research 2
Fever and Fatigue
Huhn et al. (2005) [35]
Reed et al. (2004) [19]
Reynolds et al. (2006) [29]
Formenty et al. (2010) [21]
Jezek et al. (1987) [32]
Bavari & Whitehouse (2005) [28]
Macneil et al. (2009) [3]
Sale et al. (2006) [15]
Di Giulio & Eckberg (2004) [5]
Nolen et al. (2015) [33]
Parker et al. (2007) [14]
Rash
Huhn et al. (2005) [35]
Reed et al. (2004) [19]
Reynolds et al. (2006) [29]
Formenty et al. (2010) [21]
Jezek et al. (1987) [32]
Bavari & Whitehouse (2005) [28]
Macneil et al. (2009) [3]
Sale et al. (2006) [15]
Di Giulio & Eckberg (2004) [5]
Nolen et al. (2015) [33]
Parker et al. (2007) [14]
Breman (2000) [34]
Lymphadenopathy
Huhn et al. (2005) [35]
Reed et al. (2004) [19]
Reynolds et al. (2006) [29]
Formenty et al. (2010) [21]
Jezek et al. (1987) [32]
Bavari & Whitehouse (2005) [28]
Macneil et al. (2009) [3]
Sale et al. (2006) [15]
Di Giulio & Eckberg (2004) [5]
Nolen et al. (2015) [33]
Parker et al. (2007) [14]
Lesions (including palms
of hands and soles of feet)
Huhn et al. (2005) [35]
Reed et al. (2004) [19]
Reynolds et al. (2006) [29]
Formenty et al. (2010) [21]
Jezek et al. (1987) [32]
Bavari & Whitehouse (2005) [28]
Macneil et al. (2009) [3]
Sale et al. (2006) [15]
Di Giulio & Eckberg (2004) [5]
Nolen et al. (2015) [33]
Parker et al. (2007) [14]
Respiratory symptoms
Reed et al. (2004) [19]
Reynolds et al. (2006) [29]
Formenty et al. (2010) [21]
Jezek et al. (1987) [32]
Parker et al. (2007) [14]
Di Giulio & Eckberg (2004)
1 Denotes original studies and research papers. 2 Denotes collation/synthesis of existing research.
Ranging from 0.5 to 1 cm in diameter and up to several thousand in number [7], the pustules
become centrally depressed, scab (crust) and then desquamate [5,14,33], which takes around
12 days [19]. It has been generally accepted the onset of rash marked the onset of infectious
period [6,10,36,37]. However the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) state that a person
may sometimes be contagious during the prodromal period [6]. The incubation period is approximately
12 days [14,15], but can be up to 21 days [6].
In 1987 pronounced lymphadenopathy was identified as the only clinical sign differentiating
MPX from smallpox and chickenpox (varicella) [5,32,35]. Although lymphadenopathy remains a key
distinguishing feature, the appearance and evolution of lesions in chickenpox is markedly different.
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Chickenpox lesions tend to be more superficial, smaller and unlike the centrifugal distribution of MPX
they are centrally located and evolve in ‘crops’ over 3–5 days, compared to the average 12 days for
MPX [34]. Thus a slower maturation of skin lesions is an important differentiation when analyzing
skin lesions [7]. It should be noted that not all MPX cases present with multiple lesions. In the USA
epidemic, a 28-year-old female who had direct contact with an infected PD and went on to develop
prodromal symptoms followed by lymphadenopathy (and later tested positive for MPXV in serologic
testing) presented with only one lesion [19,38]. Furthermore, no ‘crust’ stage was described by the
patient [38]. This case highlights the weakness of clinical recognition alone (a frequent reality for
endemic countries) when diagnosing OPXV or differentials. In endemic countries, mucosal lesions
or unusual eruptive skin rashes associated with pronounced lymphadenopathy, gastrointestinal
symptoms and hematologic abnormalities, should include MPX in the differential diagnosis [35].Trop. Med. Infect. Dis. 2016, 1, 8  5 of 13 
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Complications of MPX include encephalitis [35,39] and severe dehydration secondary to vomiting
and diarrhoea (or difficulty in drinking due to mouth lesions) [13,39]. Furthermore, tonsillitis,
pharyngitis [7,19], oedema of the eyelids and conjunctivitis are common complications [7]. Respiratory
symptoms are not referenced frequently (see Table 1), and are largely identified as a complication,
such as bronchopneumonia [13]. The lasting effect of those who survive MPX is pitted scarring [6,13].
Moreover, corneal scarring can cause extensive and permanent damage to the eyes [22]. Patients in the
USA had similar clinical features to African MPX cases but were milder in severity [5].
Biochemistry showed leucocytosis, raised transaminase levels, low blood urea nitrogen level and
hypoalbuminemia [35]. Disease burden is high in Africa and multiple co-morbidities can depress
immune response and increase vulnerability [9,14]. Approximately 20% of paediatric patients in the
USA experienced serious complications that may have proved fatal if intensive treatment had been
unavailable [35]. The CFR varies between epidemics; however the CDC places it at approximately 10%
in Africa [6]. The most recent outbreak in CAR has documented two deaths of the 26 cases between
August and October 2016 [17]—which would correspond to a CFR of 7.7%. Table 2 shows recorded
CFRs from previous outbreaks.
Table 2. Recorded Case Fatality Rate of Human Monkeypox 1970–2005.
Date and Location 1970–1979 Central andWest Africa
1981–1986
DRC
1996–1998
DRC 2003 USA 2005 South Sudan
Case Fatality Rate (%) 17 [40] 9.8 1 [41–43] 1.5 2 [44] No recorded deaths No recorded deaths
1 Specifically between 1981 and 1985 the recorded CFR was 9% [43]; 2 The low CFR between 1996 and 1997 was
suggestive of varicella not MPXV [28].
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3.2. Reservoir Host
Though the natural host remains unknown, the Gambian pouched rat and rope squirrel seem to
be the most likely candidates [1,9,11,13,45]. Both species were amongst the infected rodents imported
into the USA in 2003 [9,20,45]. Furthermore, the rope squirrel was identified as a reservoir host as early
as 1985 [46]. This was reaffirmed by Thomassen et al. (2013), when they mapped the geographical
distribution of MPX and potential reservoir hosts in DRC [9]. Recently, MPXV has been isolated in the
sooty mangabey monkey (found dead in the Ivory Coast, 2012) [4]. This discovery is relatively new
and as a result is not identified frequently within the literature but may prove vital in identification of
the reservoir host (See Table 3).
Table 3. Suspected Reservoir Host of Monkeypox Virus.
Suspected Reservoir Host Primary Research Secondary Research
Rope squirrel
(Funisciurus sp.)
Fuller et al. (2011) [45]
Thomassen et al. (2013) [9]
Khodakevich et al. (1986) [46]
Guarner et al. (2004) [18]
Sale et al. (2006) [15]
Di Giulio & Eckberg (2004) [5]
Parker & Buller (2013) [11]
Gambian pouched rat
(Cricetomys gambianus) Hutson et al. (2015) [1]
Parker & Buller (2013) [11]
Sale et al. (2006) [15]
Fuller et al. (2011) [45]
Di Giulio & Eckberg (2004) [5]
Formenty et al. (2010) [21]
Sooty mangabey monkey
(Cercocebus atys) Radonic et al. (2014) [4] Nolen et al. (2015) [33]
3.3. Diagnosis
Rapid diagnosis is crucial to limiting outbreaks, but cannot be made on clinical observations
alone [5,28]. MPXV can cause disease clinically indistinguishable from other pox-like illnesses, thus
laboratory confirmation is essential [3,5]. The WHO identifies smallpox, chickenpox, measles, bacterial
skin infections, scabies, medication allergies and syphilis amongst the differential diagnoses [47].
During the USA epidemic, laboratory evaluation of suspected MPX cases included PCR assays,
electron microscopy, immunohistochemistry, culture of material from rash specimens, and serological
testing for OPXV specific antibodies (Table 4) [30]. Unfortunately many countries burdened with MPX
suffer from limited material resources for sample collection and storage, therefore point-of-care tests
that can be used in very basic environments with limited training were needed. Since 2003 a rapid,
point-of-care diagnostic (Tetracore Orthopox BioThreat Alert®) has been developed, particularly for
field use [13,48]. In 2012 the first pilot of BioThreat Alert® was conducted, concluding it was applicable
as a point-of-care diagnostic for suspected MPX cases as well as a valuable screening tool to prioritize
samples that required further testing [48]. The BioThreat Alert® is the first lateral-flow based detection
assay for OPXV [48], and although commercially available, there is currently no description of its use
in MPX-endemic countries.
Serological testing provides evidence of virus exposure, but this testing has limitations in diagnosis
as it will detect immune responses to other OPXV exposures or vaccinations [5,30]. Studies have shown
antiviral antibody and T-cell responses rise around the time of disease onset thus new highly-sensitive
immunological techniques could improve diagnosis of MPX during an epidemic [8]. Meanwhile,
anti-poxvirus antibodies in an unvaccinated individual with a history of severe illness and rash can
suggest a diagnosis of MPX [28].
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Table 4. Diagnostic Tests for Monkeypox or Orthopoxvirus.
Test Description
Viral culture/isolation Live virus is grown and characterised from a patient specimen
Electron microscopy Clear image of a brick-shaped particle for visual classification of a poxvirus
Immunohistochemistry Tests for the presence of OPXV specific antigens
PCR (including real-time PCR) Tests for the presence of MPXV specific DNA signatures
Anti-OPXV IgG Tests for the presence of OPXV antibodies
Anti-OPXV IgM Tests for the presence of OPXV antibodies
Tetracore OrthopoxBioThreat Alert test for the presence of OPXV antigens
Source: adapted from McCollum & Damon (2014) [13]: “Diagnostic tests for monkeypox or orthopoxvirus”.
3.4. Transmission
Table 5 displays the identified modes of transmission. The PD demonstrated high susceptibility
to MPXV, becoming amplifying hosts infecting up to 47 people (none of the other imported animals
infected humans) [11]. Discovery of MPXV in the lungs of PD was the first suggestion that transmission
may have occurred via infective droplets [18]. Some USA patients were infected through existing
wounds, others through bites or scratches from infected PD [15]. The invasive exposures (compared
to fomite or droplet exposure) resulted in more severe systemic illness suggesting route of infection
affects symptom severity [29]. Interestingly, eating infected bush meat or monkeys appears to be
documented the least in terms of zoonotic transmission.
Table 5. Modes of Transmission of Monkeypox Virus.
Transmission Primary Research Secondary Research
Direct contact with infected
humans or animals
Guarner et al. (2004) [18]
Jezek et al. (1988) [7]
Meyer et al. (2002) [49]
Reed et al. (2004) [19]
Reynolds et al. (2006) [29]
Learned et al. (2005) [22]
Formenty et al. (2010) [21]
Rimoin et al. (2010) [50]
Parker & Buller (2013) [11]
Sale et al. (2006) [15]
Hammarlund et al. (2005) [8]
Hutson et al. (2015) [1]
McCollum & Damon (2014) [13]
Respiratory
Guarner et al. (2004) [18]
Hammarlund et al. (2005) [8]
Reynolds et al. (2006) [29]
Parker & Buller (2013) [11]
Hutson et al. (2015) [1]
Fomites
Hammarlund et al. (2005) [8]
Nolen et al. (2015) [33]
Reynolds et al. (2006) [29]
Formenty et al. (2010) [21]
Parker & Buller (2013) [11]
Consuming infected meats Meyer et al. (2002) [49]Nakouné E, Kazanji M (2012) [51]
Parker & Buller (2013) [11]
Sale et al. (2006) [15]
Thomassen et al. (2013) [9]
It is now confirmed MPXV is spread via exhaled large droplets [14], although these are unable
to travel more than a few feet, thus prolonged close contact is required for human-to-human
transmission [6,8]. Early studies believed human-to-human transmission of MPX was unsustainable
and therefore not considered a serious public health threat [5,7]. However, an outbreak of CB MPXV in
Republic of Congo in 2003 found six sequential passages of transmission [22]. Furthermore, a 2013 DRC
study recently identified more than seven suspected human-to-human transmission events resulting
in 42 apparent cases. However, they were unable to determine definitively if multiple introductions,
either human or zoonotic, had occurred. They concluded the average household attack rate was 50%
in an area undergoing a 600-fold increase of MPX cases, the highest ever reported [16]. There are no
recorded cases of sustained human-to-human transmission with WA MPXV [6].
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Identified risk factors for human-to-human transmission of MPX include sleeping in the same
room/bed as an infected person, and activities that introduce the virus directly to the oral mucosa
such as sharing the same plate and cups as an infected person [33].
Risk factors for zoonotic transmission of MPXV include living in forested or recently deforested
areas [50]; no smallpox vaccination [50]; handling or eating dead bush meat or monkeys [49,51], and
sleeping on the floor (in endemic areas) [33].
3.5. Prevention and Treatment
In 1979 the Global Commission for the Certification of Smallpox Eradication determined that
smallpox vaccination to prevent MPX was not justified [5]. In 2010 a study comparing active
surveillance data from a health zone in DRC from the 1980s and data from the same health zone
in 2006/7 showed a 20-fold increase in MPX incidence. Furthermore, over 90% of the identified
cases were born after the cessation of the smallpox eradication program, highlighting the impact
of declining smallpox vaccination coverage [50]. In the 2003 USA epidemic the CDC recommended
smallpox vaccination (ACAM2000™) up to 14 days post-MPXV exposure, for symptom reduction but
not prevention of the disease [6,52]. The smallpox vaccine is currently not available to the public [6],
nor used in MPXV endemic areas [41] due to concerns of cost, safety of using a vaccine containing live
vaccinia virus, and the unknown effects of the vaccine in immunocompromised persons [16].
MPXV endemic countries are only found in sub-Saharan Africa, and this region of the
world also accounts for 71% of the global burden of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) [53].
Immunocompromised persons are at higher risk of serious vaccine complications, including
progressive vaccinia (a rare but potentially fatal adverse event following smallpox vaccination causing
progressive destruction of skin and tissue) [54,55] and potentially life-threatening side effects such as
pneumonia and cryptococcal meningitis [56]. One of the prominent vaccines used in the smallpox
global eradication campaign was Dryvax® [57]. However, it caused concerning amounts of cardiac
complications amongst recipients, and when used in immunocompromised persons major reactions
were observed [58,59]. Due to these concerns, the end of the smallpox eradication campaign saw
new replicating smallpox vaccine development. Those recommended by the CDC include the second
generation vaccine ACAM2000™ (live attenuated vaccine originating from Dryvax®), and the further
attenuated third generation modified vaccinia Ankara (MVA) vaccine, Imvamune [58]. Since 2007 the
USA has been stock piling ACAM2000™ [57] and currently recommended it for post-exposure use in
MPX cases (up to 14 days), to reduce symptoms but not necessarily prevent disease [6]. ACAM2000™
is similar to Dryvax® in terms of immunogenicity, but unfortunately it also causes a similar frequency
of cardiac adverse events [57]. Furthermore, its safety has not been tested in persons with HIV
infection [56]. At the time of writing this paper, there is no specific advice from the CDC regarding
smallpox vaccine in immunocompromised people who have been exposed to MPXV. However, since
2015 the CDC recommends that persons with HIV infection and CD4 cell counts of 50–199 cells/mm3
(those with CD4 cell counts <50 cells/mm3 might not benefit from smallpox vaccine [56]), who have
been exposed to smallpox should be vaccinated with Imvamune (when antivirals are not available).
If the CD4 count is above 200 cells/mm3 ACAM2000™ is recommended, as it is currently believed
to be more effective (in animal studies of MPXV-infected monkeys, ACAM2000™ achieved complete
viral suppression whereas Imvamune did not [58].) [56].
The need for a safer smallpox vaccine is evident, as currently if a mass vaccination were to take
place, 1 in 145 persons vaccinated could develop cardiac complications such as myopericarditis [57]
and, as cited by the WHO, in a country such as Germany with a population of 82 million, between 46
and 268 deaths could be expected, using the current second generation vaccines [58]. For this reason the
CDC, WHO and Advisory Committee on Immunisation Practices (ACIP) do not recommend pre-event
smallpox vaccination outside of certain identified groups including field investigators, veterinarians,
animal-control and military personnel, and laboratory and health-care workers who are investigating,
or are first-line responders at risk of, OPXV virus exposure [5,58,60].
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Due to weaknesses of the currently available smallpox vaccines, exploration of other therapies
such as immunoglobulin and antiviral therapies are of major importance in preventing severe or
fatal OPXV infection amongst immunocompromised persons [54]. As of November 2016, two leading
antiviral drugs were in development, namely ST-246 (Tecovirimat) and CMX001 (Brincidofovir, derived
from the licensed antiviral drug cidofovir) [61]. Although stockpiled in the USA, the use of ST-246 as
prophylaxis is still under Investigational New Drug (IND) status by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) [6,62]. Categorised as a biodefence product, the treatment for therapeutic use is in phase III
trials and development for use as an adjunct with smallpox vaccines (to prevent disease and reduce
vaccine-related complications) is at pre-clinical trial stage [62]. The use of antivirals for treatment
of OPXV disease in animal studies have proven successful, with no major adverse events. In 2010 a
randomized double-blind, placebo-controlled study was conducted with inoculating a lethal dose of
MPXV into cynomolgous macaques, and found the use of ST-246 three or four days post-infection
not only protected animals from deadly infection, but also reduced lesion formation and viral DNA
levels in the blood [54,63]. So far, Phase I clinical trials have shown that ST-246 is a safe therapeutic for
treating OPXV infections in humans (in the early stages), and even prevents disease if given in the
incubation period [54,63]. During the USA outbreak the CDC recommended the use of ST-246, but are
still further establishing the efficacy of its use treating MPXV in humans [6]. Development of guidance
documents for the use of antivirals for OPXV by the CDC was in progress at time of writing [56].
With regards to immune globulin, the CDC only recommends vaccinia immune globulin (VIG)
for prophylactic use in severely immunodeficient persons exposed to MPXV, as there has been no
proven benefit in its treatment of smallpox complications [6]. Like ST-246, VIG also remains under
IND category [6]. Advances in vaccinations and antiviral treatments since the eradication of smallpox
is encouraging.
Further development of third generation MVA vaccines including ACAM3000 and TBC-MVA
is ongoing [58], and clinical trials continue for antiviral therapies. Ultimately, until these advances
become available to those living in remote endemic environments, prevention of MPX requires reduced
contact with infected animals and prevention of human-to-human transmission through isolation
and basic hygiene [33,41]. Film-based educational activities have been effective in MPX awareness
in DRC [39], but further health education campaigns focused on the handling of possible animal
reservoirs is needed [50].
4. Discussion
The smallpox-like rash and classic prodromal symptoms can make MPX difficult to differentiate
from other pox-like illness. However, marked lymphadenopathy and lesions on mucosa, palms and
soles, are key distinguishing clinical features of MPX. The USA epidemic deepened our clinical
understanding of MPX, revealing biochemistry findings that were previously difficult to obtain,
and stimulating new research. Yet we currently have an incomplete understanding of MPXV
transmission [1].
It is unknown if the animal species endemic to the USA can maintain a zoonotic cycle of MPXV [5].
However, it is believed repeated animal reintroduction of MPXV is required to sustain the disease
in the human population [64]. Despite the importance of reservoir species in transmission, studies
suggest the survival of MPXV is affected by environmental conditions [9]. Common theories include:
(i) specific temperature and light conditions increase the time MPXV survives outside a host [9];
(ii) deforestation and flooding could increase habitats for species carrying MPXV, causing increased
frequency and contact thus risk of transmission [9], as seen in the 2005 Sudan flooding and subsequent
MPX outbreak [21]; and (iii) expansion of the rainforest driven by warmer and more humid conditions
may allow MPXV and its reservoirs to also expand their geographic range, potentially leading to
accelerated dissemination of the virus [65].
As human-to-human transmission appears to be limited, the majority of MPX cases are closely
linked with spill-over transmission from animal reservoirs, thus the geographic range of MPX will
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be influenced by the habitat of the reservoir species [45,50]. If establishment of MPXV in a reservoir
outside of Africa is possible, the global public health setback would be considerable [19]. This would
result in a lost opportunity to combat the infection while its current geographic territory is limited [50].
Surveillance of MPX is difficult due to limited resources and infrastructure, inappropriate
diagnostic material, difficulties in accessing conflict areas [9,41], and lack of clinical recognition of
MPX [13,45]. Awareness of the key clinical characteristic of MPX will aid clinical detection. Moreover,
development of easy-to-use rapid tests in combination with simple diagnostic algorithms [3] would
aid diagnosis and thereby the containment of an MPX epidemic [5].
5. Conclusions
Smallpox vaccination has allowed for relatively low MPX incidence [9]. However, a younger,
non-immune generation combined with populations dependent on hunting for food have resulted
in re-emergence [28,50]. Smallpox vaccination is contraindicated in immunodeficient individuals.
Further development of MVA vaccines is underway, but full licensure of antiviral treatment options
to compliment prevention activities should be considered [61]. Avoidance to do so implies ignoring
MPX morbidity and mortality currently endured by indigenous populations most notably in endemic
DRC [50].
The USA epidemic proved MPXV has the capacity to infect and cause high levels of morbidity
in a range of hosts worldwide [11,50]. Had it been the more aggressive CB clade a high mortality
may have ensued [14]. Globalisation means countries must not ignore what were once considered
geographically-restricted infectious agents [5]. Improved surveillance is needed for strategies to target
transmission reduction [50] and increase knowledge of disease burden [13]. The sylvatic component of
the cycle means eradication is not possible [28], therefore prevention becomes paramount. In light of
environmental impacts, further research to identify the reservoir host or hosts, and targeted educational
programmes, are necessary to protect those most vulnerable.
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